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This paper explores sources of deposit dollarization unrelated to standard moral hazard 
arguments. We develop a model in which banks choose the optimal currency composition of their 
liabilities. We argue that the equal treatment of peso and dollar claims in the event of bank default 
can induce banks to attract dollar deposits above the socially desirable level. The distortion arises 
because dollar deposits are the only source of default risk in the model, but dollar depositors 
share the burden of the default with peso depositors. The incentive to dollarize is reinforced by 
common banking system safety nets such as deposit and bank insurance. Our findings suggest 
that regulators in bi-currency economies would potentially benefit by departing from the 
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In many emerging markets domestic ﬁnancial intermediation is carried out in two (or more)
currencies. Since the dollar is generally the main foreign-currency of choice, this phenomenon
has been named ﬁnancial dollarization in the literature. Financial dollarization can take
several forms, including foreign borrowing (domestic banks or local ﬁrms borrowing directly
from abroad as in the case of Thailand and Indonesia in the 90s or Chile and Argentina in the
early 80s) and deposit dollarization (domestic asset holders saving locally in foreign-currency
deposits as in Turkey and Argentina in the 90s).
While the issue of foreign borrowing has received attention in the literature (see Diaz
Alejandro (1985), Burnside et al. (2001b) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002))1,d e -
posit dollarization has been almost completely neglected,2 despite the evidence suggesting its
empirical relevance in many emerging markets (see Baliño et al (1999)). In principle there
are reasons why domestic savers may prefer to save in dollars rather than in domestic cur-
rency (henceforth, for simplicity, the peso). Thomas (1985) and Ize and Levy Yeyati (2002)
explain the process of dollarization as an optimal portfolio choice by depositors. These mod-
els, however, ignore important aspects of the ﬁnancial intermediation process such as the
balance sheet imbalances caused by currency mismatches. In this paper we abstract from the
depositor’s decision and focus on whether it may be in the best interest of banks in emerg-
ing markets to attract dollar deposits. By acquiring dollar deposits, banks face a trade-oﬀ
between the lower dollar rates and an increase in default risk associated with currency mis-
match.3 We are interested in examining under what conditions the former eﬀect dominates
the latter and whether these conditions induce excessive dollarization by banks. We also
address the implications for bank regulators in emerging markets.
1A number of papers have build upon the currency mismatch that arise in these models to generate currency
crisis models. They include Aghion et al. (2000), Dooley (1997), McKinnon and Pill (1998), Corsetti, Roubini
and Pesenti (1999) and Chang and Velasco (2000).
2With a few exceptions, the literature that tackled deposit dollarization has typically focused on currency
substitution rather than asset substitution issues, despite the fact that the bulk of observed dollarization has
ocurred in the savings component of broad money (interest bearing deposits) with little, if any, substitution
of the domestic currency been as a means of payment.
3In the event of a sudden devaluation, the erosion of the dollar value of bank assets denominated in pesos
impinges on the capacity to repay deposits of currency-imbalanced banks or, if banks’ dollar position is limited
by the regulator, of dollar-indebted ﬁrms. A similar trade-oﬀ appears in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002)
in the context of foreign borrowing by ﬁrms.
2In our model, limited-liability banks choose the currency composition of their liabilities.
They collect peso and dollar deposits from risk-neutral depositors to ﬁnance domestic projects
with known peso returns.4 Exchange rate risk is the sole source of uncertainty in the model.
The presence of dollar deposits gives rise to a currency imbalance in the banks’ balance sheet
that implies that low exchange rate states (i.e., peso depreciations) are associated with bank
insolvency. In this context, the treatment of deposits in the case of bank default is the key
to distinguishing between the banks’ and the central planner’s valuation of dollar deposits.5
We show that an equal treatment of peso and dollar deposits in the event of a bank
liquidation, creates an incentive for banks to dollarize.6 F o ra n yg i v e np a i ro fd e p o s i tr a t e s ,
the cost for banks of dollar deposits relative to peso deposits is larger the lower is the exchange
rate. But it is in those states when the exchange rate is low that a bank is likely to default, and
therefore not internalize the cost diﬀerential between deposits. Thus, the peso-dollar spread
priced by risk neutral depositors will exceed the eﬀective relative cost of dollar liabilities for
the bank, inducing a preference for dollar funding. This mispricing of exchange rate risk by
banks leads to an excessive level of dollarization.
O u rm a i nr e s u l td i ﬀers from most of the foreign borrowing literature cited above in that
dollar debts are not driven by the presence of government or private guarantees. In Burnside
et al (2001b) and Dooley (1997), the free insurance provided by the government induces banks
to borrow from abroad. On the other hand, in our model all that is needed is a currency-blind
liquidation policy, that is, one that distributes the residual value of the failed bank among
depositors according to the value of their claims.7 Moreover, in the free insurance models,
the burden of the default is transferred to the insurer while in our model such burden falls
onto the peso depositors. In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002), the incentive for ﬁrms to
4While we assume that project returns are entirely denominated in pesos, the results can be readily extended
to include the case in which a fraction of borrowers have foreign-denominated income.
5Methodologically, our paper is closer to Thomas (1985) and Blum (1999), diﬀering from the tradition of
Kareken and Wallace (1978) in that, in our case, the banks’ decision is related to the liability (rathet than
the asset) side of the banks’ balance sheet.
6Note that, in the event of default, depositors still recover a fraction of their assets through the distribution
of the residual value of the failed bank’s portfolio.
7The result extends to liquidation policies that, while not currency-blind, do not strongly discriminate
against dollar depositors. This treatment is not unusual in practice. For instance, bankruptcy laws do not
adjust creditors’ assets for their currency of denomination. For a summary of how prudential regulation deals
with foreign exchange risk, see Abrams and Beato (1998).
3issue excessive dollar debt arises from the interaction between the value of dollar collateral
and the presence of ﬁnancial constraints. As in Caballero and Krishnamurthy, our model also
presents the advantage of not having to rely on an insurer with deep pockets. In our model,
by contrast, the incentive to dollarize closely depends on the interaction between default risk
and currency risk. We believe that this interaction is a crucial feature of emerging markets
economies.
The introduction of deposit or bank insurance reinforces the main eﬀect of the model. For
instance, a deposit insurance that does not discriminate between currencies, by increasing
the recovery value of deposits in both currencies in the event of default, widens the wedge
between the peso-dollar spread and the eﬀective funding costs faced by banks, reinforcing the
previous eﬀect. As in the case of no deposit insurance, the incentive to dollarize arises from
the mispricing of exchange rate risk rather than from the standard moral hazard consequences
of insurance.8
In the model, the standard consequences of free insurance are present as an additional
force inducing deposit dollarization. For instance, a lender of last resort that provides insur-
ance to banks irrespective of their level of dollarization reduces the cost of risk taking, which
in the context of the model implies a higher equilibrium share of dollar deposits. Banks are
willing to increase the level of dollar funding as they transfer part of the exposure to the
provider of the insurance services. This result is analogous to that in Kareken and Wallace
(1978) and Burnside et al (2001b) who ﬁnd that, in the presence of government guarantees,
it is optimal for limited liability banks to hold as risky a portfolio as permissable to maximize
the value of the guarantee. In our model, however, full dollarization is mitigated because of an
additional intertemporal value eﬀect that reduces the incentive to dollarize as risk increases.9
Ad i ﬀerent form of bank insurance comes from the (explicit or implicit) commitment of the
Central Bank to defend the price of the domestic currency. As opposed to Dooley (1997)
we ﬁnd that a goverment’s promise to defend the exchange rate has ambiguos eﬀects on the
8The standard moral hazard eﬀe c ti sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hG r o s s m a na n dH a r t( 1 9 9 2 ) . T h e ys t r e s st h a tt h e
possibility of a bailout reduces the incentive to exert eﬀort and encourages managerial shirking and risk
taking. See Freixas and Rochet (1997) Ch.9 for applications to bank insurance.
9Blum (1999) describes a similar eﬀect when assessing the eﬀect of capital adequacy rules in the banks’
riskiness. Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1999) discuss extensively this value eﬀect when examining the impact of
bank insurance on banks’ risk appetite.
4equilibrium dollarization.
In our model, the mispricing of exchange rate risk arises because of a negative externality
of having dollar deposits. Dollar-deposits are the only source of default risk in the model
but the burden of the default is shared across all deposits. Standard banking practices (such
as deposit insurance or central bank assistance) that do not discriminate between currencies
reinforce this externality. For instance, central banks are not known to base their assistance
to particular banks on the currency composition of their portfolios above and beyond what
is required by prudential regulations. Moreover, currency-blind deposit insurance is the
rule rather than the exception. In her extensive survey, Garcia (1999) ﬁnds that less than
twenty out of seventy-two countries with bi-currency ﬁnancial systems discriminate against
foreign-currency deposits by excluding them from the insurance coverage. Demirguc-Kunt
and Detragiache (2000) ﬁnd evidence that deposit insurance which includes coverage for
foreign currency increases the probability of a bank run.10 Our investigation points to the
beneﬁts of extending banking practices and regulations to include a distinct role for deposits
denominated in diﬀerent currencies.
Finally, the model also highlights an interesting empirical implication, namely, that the
peso-dollar interest rate spread typically used to measure currency risk generally underes-
timates devaluation expectations, the more so the larger the deposit dollarization ratio is.
This implication is in line with evidence in Schmukler and Serven (2002) that shows that, in
highly dollarized Argentina and Hong Kong, forward discounts exceed the currency premium
implicit in bank interest rates, particularly during currency runs when deposit dollarization
tends to peak.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the basic model and describe the
centralized and decentralized equilibria with no deposit or bank insurance. In section 3 we
analyze, in turn, how insurance aﬀects the degree of deposit dollarization in the economy. In
section 4 we discuss the empirical implications of the results for the measurement of currency
10They suggest that, just as in the case of general deposit insurance, foreign-currency coverage may stimulate
banks’ risk-taking behaviour due to standard moral hazard considerations. We provide a diﬀerent explanation
for this link between insurance and the propensity to banking crises: the extension of insurance to foreign
currency bank liabilities endogenously drives up dollarization, which, in turn, leaves banks more exposed to
currency risk. Thus, even in the absence of market discipline, dollar deposit insurance contributes to ﬁnancial
fragility.
5risk based on market interest rates. In section 5 we discuss the empirical and normative
implications of the model and conclude.
II. The Model
This section presents a simple dynamic framework to analyze the determinants of the currency
composition of banks’ deposit portfolio in a bi-currency banking system. We examine how
banks, depositors, and the central bank (alternatively, the bank liquidation agency) interact
in an economy with exchange rate risk as the only source of risk.
Consider the case of limited liability banks endowed with an investment technology that
uses 1 dollar (or 1/e pesos, where e is the dollar/peso exchange rate) to produce R pesos
at the end of the period. Normalizing the current exchange rate e0 to one, assume that the
end-of-period exchange rate is distributed according to f(e) with support [0,∞], f(0) = 0,
and mean em.W e c a n t h i n k o f e as driven by exogenous shocks, with low values (large
depreciations) corresponding to bad states of nature. Finally, for simplicity, assume that the
distribution of end-of-period exchange rate rate changes is identical in each period (i.e., does
not depend on history).
The assumption that investment returns are denominated in pesos captures the fact that,
whenever the degree of ﬁnancial dollarization exceeds the fraction of the real economy eﬀec-
tively dollarized, there is a currency mismatch somewhere in the economy. In the event of
a sudden devaluation, the erosion of the dollar value of peso-denominated assets impinges
on the debtors’ capacity to repay, either of dollar-indebted ﬁrms or of currency imbalanced
banks. For simplicity, we model this currency mismatch in the banks’ balance sheet.11
Each bank has to decide the optimal currency composition of its liability portfolio. Given
the recursive nature of the problem, and expressing values in dollar terms, we can express
11The model, however, is quite general. It could be easily extended to the case in which banks are assumed
to lend in the same currency due to limits on the currency position. As the recovery value of their loans
w i l ls t i l lb el i m i t e db yt h ep e s oi n c o m eo ft h eb o r r o w e r ,t h ec u r r e n c ym i s m a t c hi ss i m p l ys h i f t e dt ot h eﬁrms
(i.e., replaced by exchange rate-related credit risk), to the same result. Also, substituting ﬁrms for banks, the
model could be readily applied to the case of direct ﬁnancing.
6the bank’s objective function as:
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max[0,e(R − (1 − λ)rp) − λrd)]f(e)de (2)
where λ is the share of dollar deposits, rp and rd are the (gross) interest rates of peso and
dollar deposits, respectively, and P(λ) is the probability that the bank does not default. The




[e(R − (1 − λ)rp) − λrd]f(e)de = P(λ)[e(λ)(R − (1 − λ)rp) − λrd] (3)
where ec denotes the critical value of end-of period exchange rate below which bank liabilities











In the absence of insurance, when a bank defaults it is liquidated at a discount 0 <θ≤ 1
and the residual value of the liquidated bank, θR, is distributed among depositors (in a way
to be discussed below). Finally, we assume that R is such that, for any liquidation cost θ, it
is eﬃcient to have a positive level of investment, that is,
PeR > rf. (6)
For future reference, note that e>e m >e c.
To make our argument as plain as possible, we simplify the depositor’s portfolio decision
problem. We assume that risk-neutral depositors can either invest in dollar deposits, peso
12For future reference note that e
0
c > 0 implies that P
0 < 0.
7deposits or an outside risk-free asset with return rf > 1.13 This implies that depositors are





ee rpf(e)de = rf =
Z ∞
0
e rdf(e)de = re
d (7)
where e ri equals ri if the bank does not default, and whatever return they receive from the cen-
tral bank in case of default. Depositors do not observe the bank’s dollarization share. Thus,
we implicitly assume that the bank cannot commit to a posted interest rate (which would
reveal the bank’s portfolio choice), reﬂecting the fact that rates are customarily negotiated
with each client on a personal basis.
A. Centralized equilibrium
As a useful benchmark, we present the solution for the optimal dollarization share in a
centralized equilibrium. A risk neutral central planner maximizes the expected return to
investment minus expected funding and liquidation costs, taking into account the eﬀect the
composition of liabilities has on the deposits interest rates. Replacing (7) into (1), we then
obtain:14







eRf (e)de − (1 − θ)
Z ec(λ)
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Proposition 1. When θ<1, the optimal share of dollar deposits is λ∗ =0 .W h e nθ =1
the central planner is indiﬀerent about the composition of funding.
Proof. The result follows immediately from e
0
c > 0.¥
In other words, in the presence of liquidation costs it is optimal that banks fully hedge
exchange rate risk by demanding no dollar deposits.15 The intuition is straightforward: since
13For a discussion of the role of risk aversion in the depositors’ portfolio problem, see Ize and Levy Yeyati
(2001).
14It follows from condition (6) that R is big enough for investment to be optimal.
15This proposition is analogous to the results in Kareken and Wallace (1978), where they show that with no
8the central planner internalizes the eﬀect λ has on rp(λ) and rd(λ), dollarization does not en-
tail any gain in terms of lower funding costs, while it does generate a potential risk of default,
with the associated losses due to liquidation costs. Without these costs, the Modigliani-
Miller principle applies (the central planner is indiﬀerent regarding the denomination of bank
funding).
B. Decentralized equilibrium
In the absence of a deposit or bank insurance scheme, interest rates depend crucially on
the way the bank’s assets are distributed among depositors in the event of default (what
we henceforth refer to as the “liquidation policy”). Any liquidation policy can be generally
characterized by the recovery ratios δi (λ,e) applicable to deposits in currency i,d e ﬁned
as the share of the deposit certiﬁcate that is repaid at maturity. The fact that the (dollar)
residual value of the bank, eθR, is completely distributed among depositors implies that these
ratios have to satisfy the following aggregate constraint:
(1 − λ)eδp (λ,e)rp + λδd (λ,e)rd = eθR.
Denoting the expected recovery value (again, expressed in dollars) of a unit currency i-









In turn, using (5), depositors’ expected returns must satisfy the following arbitrage con-
dition:
re
p = rp [P (λ)e + Sp(λ)] = rd [P (λ)+Sd (λ)] = re
d = rf. (12)
government guarantees (in their case, no deposit insurance) the presence of bankruptcy costs induce banks to
avoid bankruptcy states, which implies fully hedging against the existing risk. Our Proposition 1 also closely
resembles Proposition 4.1 in Burnside et al. (1999).
16Note that the recovery ratio for peso and dollar deposits may vary with the exchange rate. Therefore, the
expected recovery value for each type of deposit has to be expressed in a common currency.













For future reference, s(λ) ≡ Sdrd − Sprp is a measure of the expected cross-transfer
from peso deposits to dollar deposits in the event of a default. Note that, if the liquidation
policy implies that the recovery value of dollar deposits is higher than the recovery value
of peso deposits (expressed in dollars), then there is a transfer of resources from peso to
dollar depositors that have to be compensated by a higher expected return of peso deposits
in non-default states. More precisely, the higher the cross-transfer, the higher the peso-dollar
spread demanded by risk neutral depositors. The general link between liquidation policies




≷ 0 iﬀ Sdrd ≷ Sprp (where λ+  (0,1]), and s(0) = 0.
In particular, a currency-blind liquidation policy that grants equal treatment across de-
posits of diﬀerent currencies (that is, δp = δd), by fully recognizing the exchange rate insur-




e(1 − λ)rp + λrd
, (14)




δ(λ,e)(rd − rpe)f (e)de > 0. (15)
On the other extreme, a liquidation policy that completely ignores valuation gains (as,
e.g., in the case of a compulsory conversion of dollar deposits to the local currency at the
rate e0)w o u l de n t a i lδd (λ,e)=eδp (λ,e).A s ar e s u l t ,Sp = Sd = θR
(1−λ)rp+λrd = S, s(λ)=


















0 (1 − δ(λ,e))f (e)de
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R ec








10S (rd − rp) < 0, and peso depositors are subsidized by dollar depositors, as the latter are
punished in the event of the default.
We are now ready to analyze the banks’ equilibrium allocation. A Nash equilibrium is
deﬁned as the triplet (λD,r p,rd) such that the bank maximizes (1), condition (12) holds, and
























and (13), we get:
π0 = P(erp − rd)=s(λ) (17)
and
π00 = P0 (ecrp − rd) ≥ 0. (18)
From (16) and (17) it can be easily seen that:
i) If s(λ) > 0, the solution to the static problem (maximization of current proﬁts, equation
(3)) is always at the corner λ =1 .18
ii) There is an intertemporal eﬀect that reduces the incentive to dollarize, as the bank’s
expected future value falls by the term ρP0V when the share of dollar deposits (and the
probability of default) increases.
It can be proven that, for a low discount factor ρ, the stimulus to dollarize prevails, as
the following proposition formally states:
Proposition 2. For ρ ≤ ρc ≡
rf
emR, s(λ) > 0 implies that any decentralized equilibrium
λD must satisfy λD >λ ∗ =0 .
Proof. See appendix for proof.¥
18The problem is convex, and π
0 ≥ 0 for all λ. This implies bang-bang solutions similar to those found in
Suarez (1993). The model can be easily extended to include liquidity services of the domestic currency. While
in this case the solution to the problem may be interior, our main result, namely that there is a positive link
between s and λ,s t i l lh o l d s .
11The main intuition behind this proposition comes from the eﬀect of the liquidation policy
on the wedge between the eﬀective funding costs in pesos and dollars for the bank relative
to the market price of peso and dollar deposits. Since the bank only pays depositors in
non-default states, the relative peso funding cost is given by
rpe
rd , where e is the average
exchange rate for those states. When the liquidation policy entails no cross-transfer (s =0 ),
no additional premium is required by peso deposit holders in non-default states (from (13),
rpe = rd). Then, absent any cost beneﬁt of dollar funding, the bank shies away from the
dollar to avoid currency risk.19
As the cross-transfer increases, s>0, the expected recovery value for dollar relative
to pesos deposits rises, and with it the peso-dollar spread demanded by depositors. This
higher spread introduces a positive wedge between the eﬀective funding cost of peso deposits
relative to dollar deposits (rpe−rd > 0). This cost advantage associated with dollar funding
eventually dominates the disincentives arising from the intertemporal eﬀect, inducing deposit
dollarization.
Thus, in our simple setup, deposit dollarization is entirely accounted for by the cross-
transfers implicit in the liquidation policy. Note, in particular, that there is no need for a
government guarantee, in the form of deposit or bank insurance, for the result to hold. Simple
recognition of the currency of denomination of the deposit contract is enough to generate the
result.
While the argument is valid for a variety of diﬀerent liquidation schemes, in what follows
we restrict our attention to the realistic (and more tractable) benchmark of a currency-blind
liquidation policy as described in (14).
III. Insurance
Previously, we showed how the loss sharing implicit in default events resulted in endogenous
dollarization. In this section we introduce deposit and bank insurance to explore how each of
these standard safety nets inﬂuences the incentives for endogenous dollarization. In the ﬁnal
19In the absence of a cross-transfer (s =0 ), the peso-dollar spread simply reﬂects exchange rate risk
considerations, as default risk aﬀe c t sd e p o s i t si nb o t hc u r r e n c i e si nt h es a m ew a y ,a n dt h es p r e a dc o r r e c t l y
captures the relative cost of borrowing in diﬀerent currencies for the bank.
12part of this section, we explore the consequences of an (anticipated) exchange rate defense
as an alternative insurance mechanism against exchange rate shocks.
A. Deposit insurance
The framework of the previous section can be readily applied to analyze the eﬀect of an
(implicit or explicit) currency-blind deposit insurance scheme (DIS) on the equilibrium share
of dollar deposits. For expositional purposes, in what follows we assume that the DIS is
ﬁnanced through lump-sum taxes.20
A partial insurance policy can be characterized by a coverage ratio δDIS ≡ δ(λ,e;k)=




max{δ(λ,e),k}(rd − rpe)f (e)de >
Z ec
0
δ(λ,e)(rd − rpe)f (e)de > 0, (19)
so that, using the same argument as Proposition 2, it can be shown that, for suﬃciently
low discount factors, zero deposit dollarization can never be achieved in equilibrium under
deposit insurance. More formally, from (19) it follows that:
Proposition 3. For ρ ≤ ρc ≡
rf
emR, any decentralized equilibrium dollarization ratio
under deposit insurance, λDIS, must satisfy λDIS >λ ∗ =0 .
Proof. Along the lines of Proposition 2.¥
Note that, as in Proposition 2, the result is driven by the eﬀect the DIS has on the
current relative pricing of deposits and not from the well-known moral hazard consequences
of insurance. From the depositors’ standpoint, the DIS enhances the insurance properties of
the dollar by enlarging the fraction of dollar deposits that are protected against exchange rate
risk for non-default states, increasing their attractivenes as a hedge against large devaluations
and inducing peso depositors to demand a compensating premium that creates a wedge
between the market spread and the eﬀective relative costs to the bank. In passing, it is
20This case, which assumes that DIS outlays are ﬁnanced ex-post through the government budget, broadly
corresponds to cases of implicit insurance or ﬂat-rate, underpriced DIS. The analysis can be easily generalized
to other ﬁnancing strategies as long as they do not discriminate across currencies.
21Note that δ
DIS = k would imply that, for some states of nature, k<δ(λ,e), so that depositors will be
distributed less than the residual value of the bank with the diﬀerence accruing to the DIS agency, an arguably
unrealistic situation.
13interesting to note that, whenever the cost of the DIS is sustained by the government, the
s c h e m ec a nb ev i e w e da sat a xo nd e p o s i t o r si nb o t hc u r r e n c i e sw h e r e b yp r o c e e d sa r ea l l o c a t e d
disproportionally among dollar depositors.22
Less straightforward is the question of whether a DIS strengthens or weakens the incentive
to dollarize. On the one hand, it follows directly from (19) that, for given interest rates, the
DIS increases the cross-transfer s(λ) and hence banks’ incentives to dollarize their liabilities.
M o r e o v e r ,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tδ(λ,e) is increasing in e,s ot h a tt h ei n c r e a s ei nt h e
recovery value due to the DIS is larger for smaller values of e,e n h a n c i n gi t se ﬀect on s(λ).
However, the DIS increases the pool of resources to be distributed among depositors and, as
a result, reduces interest rates. In turn, lower funding costs reduce the probability of default,
detracting from the attractiveness of dollar deposits as well as increasing the strength of
the intertemporal eﬀect (as larger charter values reduces the banks’ risk-taking propensity).
Thus, whether the introduction of a DIS reduces or increases endogenous dollarization will
generally depend on the parameters of the problem.
Again, the example of a full DIS helps to illustrate this intuition. First note that, under
a full DIS, the peso-dollar spread should simply reﬂect the devaluation expectations, so that,






Then, the ﬁrst (pro-dollarization) eﬀect can be seen by comparing conditions (17) with and
without deposit insurance. Using the fact that without deposit insurance23
22Note also that the result still holds when the DIS is funded through bank contributions (e.g., a tax on
proﬁts), as long as the insurance premium does not depend on risk (i.e., the currency of denomination). In
this case, VDIS =( 1− τ)max λ
π(λ)





ex-ante based on rational expectations, so that the expected net outlays of the DIS are fully funded by banks.
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R ec
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R ec













− 1) <Pr d(
e
em − 1). (22)
However, rDIS
d = rf <r d and eDIS < e imply that we cannot rule out cases in which the
marginal impact on current revenues from increasing the dollarization ratio under deposit
insurance is smaller than without insurance, that is, π0DIS <π 0.
This ambiguity reﬂects that fact that the endogenous incentive to dollarize comes from
the way in which the bank is liquidated and, thus, increases with the probability of default,
which deposit insurance, through its eﬀect on bank fundings costs, tends to reduce.
B. Bank insurance
In the absence of deposit insurance, a lender of last resort (LLR) policy (or any other bank
insurance policy that reduces the incidence of large devaluations on bank failures) has the
same eﬀect as a DIS inasmuch as it enlarges the range of end-of-period exchange rates over
which dollar depositors are insulated from exchange rate risk.24 However, as opposed to
deposit insurance, inasmuch as it preserves the claim of shareholders on the bank charter,
the LLR introduces a new incentive to dollarize above and beyond the level encouraged by
the eﬀects cited above. To distinguish between these two diﬀerent channels, we assume in
what follows that depositors are already covered by a full DIS.
A currency-blind LLR policy that we have in mind is the following: whenever the exchange
rate at the end of the period falls below ec, with a probability β the central bank covers the
gap between bank assets and liabilities at no cost. The bank’s probability of survival is then
given by
b(λ)=( 1− β)P (λ)+β, (23)
24We deliberately ignored the delicate question of whether institutions are solvent or iliquid in the event
of a large devaluation (related, among other things, to the perceived temporariness of the exchange rate
adjustment), and whether indeed a LLR should assist banks in those circumstances.
15where b(λ) >P(λ) and 0 >b 0 (λ)=( 1− β)P0 (λ) >P 0 (λ). The bank’s problem then
becomes:





Proposition 4. Under a blanket LLR policy, the equilibrium level of dollarization is
weakly higher than otherwise,
λLLR ≥ λD. (25)










it follows that a suﬃcient condition for λLLR ≥ λD is b0VLLR ≥ P0V. But
b0VLLR =( 1− β)P0V
1 − ρP (λ)
1 − ρb(λ)
≥ P0V
since P0 < 0 and
(1 − ρb(λ)) = 1 − ρP (λ) − ρβ (1 − P (λ))
≥ 1 − ρP (λ) − β (1 − ρP (λ))
=( 1 − β)(1− ρP (λ))
¥
Thus, an LLR policy results in a reduction in the cost of risk to the banks (ie., the
loss of future rents) which induces risk-taking behavior. In the context of our model, this
behavior implies engaging in additional dollar funding. It should be clear to the reader that
these results rely on the (quite realistic) assumption that the LLR facility is available to
banks irrespective of their dollarization ratio which means that the chances of preserving the
insurance beneﬁts in the event of a devaluation are enhanced without any increase in the
eﬀective cost of dollar funding to the bank. In other words, the bank beneﬁts from lower
16dollar rates, transferring the cost to the LLR.25
Proposition 4 is analogous to results in Kareken and Wallace (1978) and Burnside et al.
(2001). Dollarization here arises due to the standard moral hazard consequences of insurance.
However, the nature of the government guarantee is diﬀerent in our paper, as the result does
not hinge on the existence of bankruptcy costs as in the aforementioned papers. Furthermore,
in this paper, the banks’ portfolio decisions are related to the currency composition of their
liabilities rather than that of their assets.
From a normative standpoint, it is easy to conceive an LLR rule contingent on the degree
of dollarization of the bank, such that β (λ), β0 (λ) < 0, which can readily undo the distortion
associated with the insurance policy. In this case,
b0 (λ)=( 1− β)P0 +( 1− P)β0, (26)
which can be set to the desired level of dollarization by making β (λ) arbitrarily steeper.
C. Bank insurance (Exchange Rate Defense)
It has been pointed out in the literature that, out of concerns regarding the negative eﬀects
of a sharp devaluation on banks’ balance sheets, the government may (explicitly or implic-
itly) intervene in the exchange rate market to limit extreme exchange rate ﬂuctuations. By
reducing exchange rate volatility, the government is reducing exchange rate risk faced by the
bank (at the expense of the stock of international reserves), which should foster ﬁnancial
dollarization in the same way as in the previous case.26 However, in practice there is always
a limit to what a government can do to countervail shifts in the equilibrium exchange rate.
We can illustrate this point in the context of our model. Assume that the central bank is
expected to intervene in the foreign exchange market to prevent the value of e from falling
below ec. However, given the limited stock of reserves, for equilibrium exchange rates below
a threshold 0 ≤ l<e c, the intervention is expected to fail. Thus, the government eﬀectively
modiﬁes the exchange rate distribution faced by banks and depositors so that its support is
25Again, the results remain true even if the LLR facility is fully funded through a ﬁxed tax on bank proﬁts
determined ex-ante.
26In diﬀerent contexts, this point has been raised by Mishkin (1996) and Obstfeld (1998).
17now [l,ec) ∪ [ec,∞].
An exchange rate defense policy has ambiguous eﬀects on the equilibrium level of dol-
larization. Two eﬀects oﬀsetting eﬀects of this policy can be identiﬁed. First, the exchange
rate risk incurred by the bank for a given dollarization ratio is now smaller, as the set of








f(e)de = P (λ)+i(λ) ≥ P (λ), (27)
with an eﬀect similar to that of the lender of last resort studied previously. As in Dooley
(1997) this policy acts as a bank insurance for banks and increases their incentive to dollarize
at the expense of Central Bank reserves. However, this policy also reduces the probability
of default (by lowering ec to l) w h i c hi nt u r nr e d u c e st h ee x p e c t e dc r o s st r a n s f e rs(λ) for
any given pair of deposit rates (see equation (10), (10) and Remark 1). Trivially, for l =0 ,
s(λ)=0and, in equilibrium, λERD =0 . Moreover, the intervention policy also changes the
exchange rate distribution faced by depositors. By shifting the distribution to the right, it
increases the preference for peso deposits and narrows the peso-dollar spread, again detracting
from the cross-transfer and the incentives for dollar funding. Thus, the impact of expected
exchange rate intervention is ambiguous.27
IV. Numerical simulations
In this section we provide a simulation of the model presented in section 2 to provide ad-
ditional insight into the analytical results. For this purpose, we use the following Gamma













de, 0 ≤ e<∞, (28)
27Ad i ﬀerent case arises if the government is expected to bail out banks in the event of a large depreciation
without intervening in the exchange rate market, for example through the extension of subsidized liquidity
assistance. Trivially, if part of the exchange rate risk is directly borne by the government, banks will face
stronger incentives to fund themselves in dollars.
18where Γ(n)=( n − 1)!. This distribution implies that em =0 .9. That is, given that e0 =1 ,
the expected depreciation of the currency equals 11.1 percent.28 It is further assumed that
depositors are covered by partial deposit insurance up to a fraction δDIS =m a x{δ(λ,e),k},
where k =0 .7. Parameter values appear in the notes to the ﬁrst ﬁgure. In particular, note
that the choice of parameters satisfy the condition of Proposition 3 (ρ<ρ c), so that the
decentralized equilibrium implies a positive level of dollarization.
Figure 1 presents the static proﬁt function in (2) for a given expected dollarization ratio,
λe =0 , and the value functions in (9) for λe =0and λe =1 . This discount factor assumed
is discount factor ρ =0 .4 (note that ρ<ρ c). As shown in the previous section, the static
proﬁts are increasing in λ for all λ. However, an increase in λ also generates an increased
probability of default in the future and thus reduces intertemporal proﬁts. Figure 1 shows
that for low levels of λ the intertemporal loss more than compensates for the gains in current
proﬁts. This eﬀect gives the value function a U-shape. From the value functions presented
in Figure 1 it is clear that λ =0is not an equilibrium and that λ =1is an equilibrium.29 It
is easy to show that that λ =1is the unique equilibrium of this game. For the comparative
statics that follow we adopt the case where ρ =0 .4 and λe =1as our baseline simulation.
Key to the main results of the paper is the fact that a bank will default in states of
nature in which the local currency suﬀers a signiﬁcant depreciation (i.e., the exchange rate
falls below a critical threshold ec). Figure 2 shows the evolution of ec, e (the average exchange
rate conditional on no default), and P, the probability of survival, as λ increases. At λ =0 ,
both the threshold ec and the probability of default, (1 − P), are zero, and the conditional
and unconditional expected exchange rate coincide (e = em =0 .9). As λ increases, ec goes
up, as bank liabilities (which are now partially denominated in dollars) exceed bank assets
(which are peso-denominated) for very low values of e. This implies that for λ>0, the
probability of default is higher than zero (1 − P>0), and the conditional mean increases
beyond the unconditional mean, i.e., e> e m.
As defaults are associated with low values of the exchange rate (see Figure 2), a currency-
28T h ec h o i c eo fe
m < 1 is purely for expositional purposes. From the previous discussion, it follows that
any Gamma distribution with f (0) = 0 and domain in R
+ would yield identical qualitative results.
29It is immediate to see that V (λ
e =0 ,λ=0 )<V(λ
e =0 ,λ=1 ) , which rules out an equilibrium at λ =0 ,
and that V (λ
e =1 ,λ=1 )>V(λ
e =1 ,λ) for all λ [0,1).
19blind liquidation policy implies that dollar returns are higher than peso returns in those
states. Arbitrage requires that these higher returns be compensated by lower returns in
non-default states, which, in turn, implies lower relative eﬀective cost of dollar funding to
banks by a factor proportional to s(λ). Figure 3 shows how the relative cost of peso funding
increases with λ. As noted, for λ =0 , the bank never defaults and the relative cost is simply
one. However, as λ increases, so do the probability of default and the conditional expected
exchange rate (so that banks pay only in the case of small depreciations), raising the relative
eﬀective cost of peso funding.
Proposition 2 in section 2 shows that there is a critical rho, ρc, such that for all ρ<ρ c,
the decentralized equilibrium is at λD > 0, while for ρ ≥ ρc,λ D =0 . Figure 4 plots the value
function (evaluated at λe =0 )at diﬀerent values of ρ for the baseline simulation (where
ρc =0 .887).O n l yw h e nρ>ρ c do we obtain V (λe =1 ,λ=1 )<V(λe =1 ,λ=0 ) ,s ot h a t
the equilibrium is no longer at λ =1 .
A. Empirical measurement of currency risk
Currency risk is typically (albeit incorrectly) used to denote both the currency risk premium
as directly measured from diﬀerential returns on assets denominated in local and foreign
currencies, and exchange rate (devaluation) expectations. An important, and often over-
looked, consequence of this is the fact that the peso-dollar premium as measured from the
market rates of return in each currency, is not independent from either the ﬁnancial dollar-
ization ratio or the existence of deposit or bank insurance.30 More concretely, as indicated in










Figure 5 illustrates this ﬁnding using the parameters of our baseline simulation. In full
dollarization case, even though the true currency risk is 11.1 percent, the measured currency
30There are other asset-speciﬁc factors that may inﬂuence the currency risk premium, such as counterparty
risk. See Schmukler and Serven (2001).
31This mismeasurement is itself correlated, among other things, with the true level of currency risk and with
liquidation costs. Indeed, it is easy to check that the higher the liquidation cost (the smaller θ), the smaller
the peso-dollar spread and the higher its diﬀerence with the true currency risk. Trivially, as liquidation costs
increase (and the recovery value of deposits with a failed bank falls to zero), the peso-dollar spread converges
to the eﬀective relative funding cost, 1
e.
20risk is only 8.5 percent. Note that, as the dollarization ratio approaches zero (and default
risk disappears), the interest rate spread converges to the true currency risk.









is higher for high levels of dollarization. The
intuition behind the result is the following. As dollarization increases, both the recovery rate
and the range of exchange rate outcomes for which exchange rate risk is perfectly insured
by dollar deposits decline, making dollar deposits relatively less attractive. Conversely, the
peso-dollar spread declines as we approach zero dollarization, converging to the true currency
risk in the limit.
V. Conclusions
This paper developed a simple framework to understand the interaction between depositors,
banks and the central bank in a bi-currency banking sector with exchange rate risk. It
departed from the traditional model of Kareken and Wallace (1978) in that banks choose the
currency composition of their deposit portfolio for a given asset structure.
We found, in general, that equal treatment of peso and dollar claims in the event of a
bank default, by raising the peso-dollar interest rate spread above the eﬀective relative funding
costs faced by banks, generates an incentive to dollarize deposits. The results obtained link
the characteristics of the banking safety net scheme (loss-sharing policy, deposit and bank
insurance) with the currency composition of deposits. When safety nets do not discriminate
between currencies, part of the exchange rate insurance of dollar deposits is extended to the
default scenario at the expense of peso depositors or the government. Risk neutral depositors
price this extra beneﬁt of dollar deposits into lower dollar rates relative to peso rates. Banks,
however, do not pay the higher costs of dollar deposits in the event of default and thus ﬁnd
it cheaper to ﬁnance their projects through dollar funding.
This result diﬀers from results in related literature in two important ways. First, the
incentive to dollarize is present even in the absence of government or private exchange rate
guarantees. We show that, under quite general conditions, any bank liquidation policy that
recognizes the currency of denomination of outstanding liabilities induces ﬁnancial dollar-
ization that is unwarranted (dollarization that would not arise in the model if dollar-funded
21banks were forced to separate from peso funded banks) and excessive (in the model, dol-
larization is suboptimal from a central planner’s point of view). Second, we ﬁnd that a
currency-blind deposit insurance creates incentives to dollarize that arise from its eﬀect on
the pricing of deposits rather than from the well-known moral hazard consequences of in-
surance. Moral hazard does play a role in the case of bank insurance (lender of last resort)
that lead banks to increase the level of deposit dollarization, since part of the cost of this
action is transferred to the provider of the insurance services. As such, our ﬁndings provide
an alternative explanation for the much discussed issue of the prevalent use of the foreign
currency in ﬁnancial intermediation in most bi-monetary economies.
Natural extensions of the present model would introduce non-exchange rate related risk
(from which we deliberately abstracted), and would endogenize the exchange rate (to reﬂect
the incidence of balance sheet costs in the government reaction to sudden adverse exchange
rate shocks). Regarding the former, our conjecture is that, inasmuch as the capacity of banks
(or, more generally, of dollar debtors) to pay is strongly correlated with the exchange rate,
the qualitative results should remain. As for the latter, if the anticipation of an exchange rate
defense favors deposit dollarization, then higher dollarization ratios, associated with higher
balance sheet costs, should make the defense ever more likely, reinforcing the eﬀects described
in this paper. Both issues deserve a more careful (analytical and empirical) exploration.
The model could also be extended in two additional dimensions. On the one hand, while
our focus on banks allowed us to study the inﬂuence of deposit insurance and central bank
assistance on dollarization, it follows closely that, by substituting ﬁrms for banks, the main
result, namely that currency-blind liquidation fosters dollar funding, could be readily applied
to direct ﬁnancing. In a more interesting extension, the intuition developed here could also
be used to explain the tendency of both the private and public sectors in most developing
countries to seek ﬁnance abroad in foreign currencies. In the presence of a non-neglegible
probability of default, foreign investors, anticipating an equal treatment across currencies
in the event of default, would demand local currency premiums deemed excessive by local
borrowers, thus inducing the dollarization of external debt.
The driving force behind the endogenous dollarization described in this paper is the equal
treatment of peso and dollar deposits in the event of a bank default despite the fact that
22dollar deposits are the source of risk. As noted, this treatment is not unusual in practice.
Bankruptcy laws do not adjust creditors’ assets for their currency of denomination. Similarly,
deposit insurance schemes tend to cover both local and foreign currency deposits in the same
terms. The case of a lender of last resort is even clearer, since central banks are not known
to base their assistance to particular banks on the currency composition of their portfolios
above and beyond what it is required by prudential regulations. Thus, on the positive front,
this paper highlights the challenges that a bi-currency ﬁnancial sector raises for the standard
currency-blind nature of banking practices which are typically conceived with single-currency
developed economies in mind. The negative externalities associated with deposit dollarization
(due to the presence of liquidation costs) are no diﬀerent than those associated with excessive
bank risk-taking of any kind, and should be treated with similar concern by the regulator.
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.2. Proof of Proposition 1:
First note that, using (17) and (18), we know that, at λ =0 ,s (0) = 1 ⇒ π0 (0) = 0,
ec (0) = 0 ⇒ P0 (0) = 0 ⇒ π00 (0) = 0 and P00 (0) < 0 so that, from






π000 (0) = −P00 (0)rf > 0. (30)
This, combined with the fact that, for λ>0, s(λ) > 0 ⇒ π0 (λ) > 0, implies that the
equilibrium for ρ =0(alt., for the static problem) is at λ =1 .
To show that λ =0is not an equilibrium, it suﬃces to show that, for ρ ∈ (0,ρ c], there
is some feasible e λ ∈ (0,1] such that V (λe =0 ,λ=0 )<V
³
λe =0 ,λ= e λ
´
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26.3. Section 4. Proof of dt
dλ < 0
To see this, ﬁrst note that, from (14), we know that the maximal recovery rate δ(λ,e) <θ .
In turn, using P0 < 0,
δ1 (λ,e)
0 = eθR
erp − rd − e(1 − λ)r0
p − λr0
d
[e(1 − λ)rp + λrd]
2 < 0.
Finally, using (4.1), dt
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Notes: The exogenous parameters used are the following : rf = 1.04; R = 1.2;
             d = 0.8; the distribution for the exchange rate used is given by (xx) in
             the main text.
Figure 2
       Notes: Same Notes as if Figure 1.
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   Notes: This figure shows the effective cost of peso deposits relative to dollar 
              deposits for banks (i.e., rp*e(upperbar)/rd). 
Figure 4
Notes: This figure shows that as rho falls it is more probable that
       lambda = 1 is an equilibrium. 
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